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Abstract: Available online public/governmental services re-
quiring authentication by citizens have considerably expanded
in recent years. This has hindered the usability and security
associated with credential management by users and service
providers. To address the problem, some countries have pro-
posed nation-scale identification/authentication systems that
intend to greatly reduce the burden of credential management,
while seemingly offering desirable privacy benefits. In this pa-
per we analyze two such systems: the Federal Cloud Creden-
tial Exchange (FCCX) in the United States and GOV.UK Verify
in the United Kingdom, which altogether aim at serving more
than a hundred million citizens. Both systems propose a bro-
kered identification architecture, where an online central hub
mediates user authentications between identity providers and
service providers. We show that both FCCX and GOV.UK Ver-
ify suffer from serious privacy and security shortcomings, fail
to comply with privacy-preserving guidelines they are meant
to follow, and may actually degrade user privacy. Notably, the
hub can link interactions of the same user across different ser-
vice providers and has visibility over private identifiable in-
formation of citizens. In case of malicious compromise it is
also able to undetectably impersonate users. Within the struc-
tural design constraints placed on these nation-scale brokered
identification systems, we propose feasible technical solutions
to the privacy and security issues we identified. We conclude
with a strong recommendation that FCCX and GOV.UK Ver-
ify be subject to a more in-depth technical and public review,
based on a defined and comprehensive threat model, and adopt
adequate structural adjustments.
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1 Introduction
The realm of services available to citizens via digital online
platforms has significantly expanded in recent years. As a re-
sult, users and service providers have experienced an increas-
ing burden of managing multiple credentials for identification
and authentication. This burden can be reduced with the help
of identity providers, available on demand to certifiably vali-
date the identity of users.
In this paper, we consider hub-based brokered identifica-
tion, in which an online central entity, called a hub, serves
as a broker to mediate the interaction between users, service
providers and identity providers. As a broker, the role of the
hub is to ensure interoperable identification and authentica-
tion, while seemingly offering desirable privacy, security and
usability guarantees. Ideally, user privacy benefits from hid-
ing the identity provider and the service provider from one
another; the service provider can safely rely on the identity
assertions received from the hub about the user; and overall
usability improves since the user does not need to ‘remember’
a large number of authentication credentials.
It is very challenging to design a brokered identification
scheme that adequately integrates well-needed properties of
privacy, security, usability, auditability and forensic capabil-
ities. In this paper, we investigate dangers arising from two
national proposals of brokered identification systems, and rec-
ommend solutions to repair them.
In the United States, the National Strategy for Trusted
Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC) [34] was published in 2011.
NSTIC laments that the “weakness of privacy protections of-
ten leave individuals, business and government reluctant to
conduct major transactions online,” and thus aims to make
“online transactions more secure for business and consumers.”
As a national strategy, NSTIC lays the vision, principles and
objectives for the development of solutions that will impact
how more than a hundred million citizens manage their iden-
tity online. Two key components of NSTIC are to leave to
users the choice of whom to entrust with their identity, and
to allow the private sector to develop the needed identity so-
lutions. In particular, NSTIC sets a basis for the development
of a new Identity Ecosystem, outlining the role of different
actors, such as the private sector and the government at the
federal and other levels.
In the UK, a similar drive exists, spearheaded by the Gov-
ernment Digital Service, part of the Cabinet Office, in the form
of an Identity Assurance Programme (IDAP). IDAP consti-
tuted a “Privacy and Consumer Advisory Group” that since
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2012 has refined a set of nine Identity Assurance Principles
[33]. For instance, Principle 4 states that “My interactions only
use the minimum data necessary to meet my needs” explicitly
referring to data processed at identity providers and service
providers to fulfill requests “in a secure and auditable man-
ner.” This refers not only to “personal data,” but also to “re-
lationship data” that allows inferring relationship between the
user and other providers.
Building on NSTIC and IDAP respectively, the US and
the UK have been developing respective nation-scale bro-
kered identification schemes: the Federal Cloud Credential
Exchange (FCCX), recently rebranded as Connect.GOV, in
the US [35]; and the GOV.UK Verify, in the UK [20]. FCCX
and GOV.UK Verify share the common goal of solving the
problem of identification and authentication in multiple public
services, with possible future extensions to the private sector.
It has been acknowledged that “identity services ... will
need to align internationally over time” [38]; and indeed, de-
spite certain differences, FCCX and GOV.UK Verify do share
striking resemblances. We illustrate their high-level architec-
tures in Fig. 1. An online central hub mediates all interactions
between service providers (hereafter denoted as relying par-
ties, RPs) and private-sector identity providers (IDPs), possi-
bly also involving additional attribute providers (ATPs). As a
result of an identification transaction (links 1–10 in the fig-
ure), the relying party identifies and authenticates the user.
In GOV.UK Verify a matching service (MS) also helps vali-
date assertions from identity providers. Both systems are con-
strained by arguable structural decisions, such as restricting
the user-agent (a web browser) to a passive role in the pro-
tocol, except for selecting and authenticating to the IDP and
relaying messages between other parties.
The FCCX and GOV.UK Verify systems seemingly pro-
vide desirable privacy and security properties, but they fail to
adequately relate them to the hub. For example, the FCCX
solicitation calls for unlinkability as a desirable property of
hiding the IDP and RP from each other. However, contrary to
what NSTIC requires, the linkability capabilities of the hub
are being ignored. Likewise, the GOV.UK Verify specifica-
tion allows the hub to learn information that can be used to
relate activities of the same user. However, the Identity Assur-
ance Principles ask that “No relationships between parties or
records should be established without the consent of the Ser-
vice User” and further related documentation makes explicit
that “it is important to understand the impacts that would re-
sult should the service be compromised [9].”
Leaving the hub outside of the scope of privacy and se-
curity goals triggers serious problems, which we evidence in
this paper. We reach the troublesome conclusion that the actual
systems are in sharp opposition to privacy guidelines, includ-
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Fig. 1. Flow of an identification transaction in FCCX and
GOV.UK Verify. Legend:↗↙ (transmission); ↕⤢⤡ (interaction);­¦ ¯ ¤ (redirection through the user web-client).
Principles [33], e.g., related with minimization of “relation-
ship data.” We find major flaws that make the systems vulner-
able to numerous privacy and security attacks, leading to the
conclusion that the FCCX and GOV.UK Verify solutions, as
currently inferred, may actually degrade the privacy of citi-
zens. Specifically, the excessive trust placed on the hub could
be notably used to support undetected mass surveillance.
On a more positive note, we show that, even within the
assumed structural constraints, more resilient hub-based bro-
kering alternatives are possible. We propose solutions that are
deployable and resolve the privacy and security issues that we
identify in the current FCCX and GOV.UK Verify. Further-
more, our solutions can balance privacy and security with ex-
ternal envisioned requirements of auditability and the ability
to perform selective forensic inspections.
Contributions. Our paper offers several main contributions:
– We distill the essential aspects of an identification transac-
tion use-case. This allows us to reason about the privacy
and security properties offered and broken by FCCX and
GOV.UK Verify.
– We highlight the exacerbated ability of the FCCX and
GOV.UK Verify hubs to link events of the same user across
different RPs, in spite of these systems advertising privacy
through (a restricted notion of) unlinkability. We show how
to achieve (a stronger notion of) unlinkability, while allow-
ing auditability and selective forensic disclosure.
– We describe a basic solution to avoid visibility of private
identifiable information by the hub. Surprisingly, this is not
part of the initial development of FCCX or GOV.UK Verify.
– We discuss the lack of resilience, in FCCX and GOV.UK
Verify, against a temporarily compromised hub being able
to impersonate users accessing RPs, and propose solutions.
Roadmap. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 defines
the brokered identification problem, the intervening parties
and the type of intended identification transactions. Section
3 infers aims and features of FCCX and GOV.UK Verify and
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enumerates additional desirable system properties. Section 4
describes how FCCX and GOV.UK Verify implement an iden-
tification transaction. Section 5 diagnoses serious privacy and
security problems and suggests respective solutions. Section 6
discusses concerns about overreach to private information and
concludes with recommendations.
2 Background
We describe the entities involved in hub-based brokered iden-
tification (§2.1), the role of pseudonyms and attributes in the
envisioned identification transaction use-case (§2.2), and the
approach followed by FCCX and GOV.UK Verify (§2.3).
2.1 The identity ecosystem
The problem of credential management arises in the context of
an identity ecosystem composed of entities with different roles.
Below, we borrow some wording from NSTIC and the FCCX
documents [34, 35].
– A user, also known as individual, citizen, or customer, is
a “person engaged in online transactions;” the term subject
can also be used to include non-person entities.
– A Relying Party (RP) “makes transaction decisions based
upon ... acceptance of a subject’s authenticated credentials
and attributes.” The term can be used to denote “individual-
ized federal agency systems and applications,” e.g., online
government tax services, but its use can also be extended to
private-sector service providers.
– An Identity Provider (IDP) is “responsible for establish-
ing, maintaining and securing the digital identity associated
with” a subject. It can be a “non-federal credential provider”
approved by an accreditation authority to provide authenti-
cation assertions up to a certain level of assurance (LOA).
Increasing LOA values (1, 2, 3, 4) increase the “level of
confidence that the applicant’s claimed identity is their real
identity” – requisites vary with the country (e.g., US [15]
and UK [10]).
– An Attribute Provider (ATP) is “responsible for ... establish-
ing ... identity attributes,” such as“legal name, current ad-
dress, date of birth, social security number, email address.”
2.2 Identification transactions
We consider identification transactions where a relying party
(RP) identifies and authenticates a user based on the ability







external use with Hub)
(username at IDP)uID
(local identifier at IDP) uLI
vID (username at RP)
vLR (local identifier at RP)
(user pseudonym
obtained from Hub)
Fig. 2. Relation between user identifiers at IDP and RP.
the RP, the goal of identification is to learn: (i) a persistent
anonymous identifier (notation found in [11, 26, 36]) of the
user, hereafter simply denoted as user pseudonym, which is
always the same when the user authenticates through the same
account at the IDP; and/or (ii) some personal attributes of the
user, validated by the IDP, e.g., name, birth date, address. For
the RP, the goal of authentication is to (i) gain confidence that
the learned values are valid for the user with whom a session is
established; and (ii) receive a certified assertion to that effect.
Link to a user account at the RP. A user may want to cre-
ate or reconnect into a personal account at some RP. How-
ever, the user only knows her own username (e.g., an email
address) at an IDP, and how to authenticate to the IDP (e.g.,
using a password). Internally, the IDP is able to associate that
username with other identifiers of the same user. In particu-
lar, for each brokered identification scheme the IDP derives a
new user pseudonym for external use with the respective hub.
Since it seems that in practice a single hub is being developed
for each of FCCX and GOV.UK Verify, hereafter we use the
symbol uwithout ambiguity to denote the user pseudonym de-
fined by the IDP for interaction with the hub. In both systems,
u is supposed to be pseudo-random and remain the same for
all transactions with the same user.
Then, the RP learns from the hub a user pseudonym v
persistently associated with the pair (u, RP), but not reveal-
ing anything about u. The RP can then internally associate the
received pseudonym to a local user account, which may con-
tain further user information. We will later describe how the
pseudonyms are transformed as part of the brokered identifica-
tion scheme. The type of transformation and the (in)visibility
of these pseudonyms is essential in determining the privacy of
the scheme, namely the possible types of (un)linkability that
can be inferred from user pseudonyms.
Attribute integration. As part of identity proofing, it may be
necessary to transmit and/or verify attributes within a transac-
tion, e.g., confirm minimal age before letting a user create an
account. In the simplest case, the initial IDP (with whom the
user authenticates) is able to validate the necessary attributes.
In more complex interactions, attribute integration might have
to involve attribute enrichment, i.e., attributes from different
attribute providers (ATPs). For instance, a user logging into a
hospital system would use the IDP to prove their identity, but
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could need an ATP to show proof of insurance. For simplicity,
we mostly ignore the case of additional ATPs – this is not yet
fully defined or developed in FCCX or GOV.UK Verify ([17,
Q&A],[20, Step 9]).
2.3 Brokered identification
Hub and Matching Services. FCCX and GOV.UK Verify
propose using a brokered identification scheme, where an on-
line central hub actively mediates the communication and en-
sures interoperability between RPs and IDPs. The systems use
standardized web back-end technologies, such as the SAML
assertion language [31] and the XML Encryption [22] and Sig-
nature [3] standards. Upon receiving an authentication request
from the RP (link 2 in Fig. 1), the hub helps the user choose
an IDP (link 3) and then redirects the user (and the request) to
the chosen IDP (link 4). Then, as a result of the user authen-
ticating to the IDP (link 5), the IDP sends to the hub a signed
assertion conveying a user pseudonym and attributes (link 6).
In both systems, the hub (and in GOV.UK Verify also the MS)
sees the pseudonym and the attributes in the clear. However,
the systems differ in how they transform the user pseudonym
between the IDP and the RP, and how they recertify the au-
thentication assertion:
– In FCCX, the hub transforms the user pseudonym u re-
ceived from IDP into a new user pseudonym v for the RP,
varying with RP. The hub removes the signature of the IDP
(and other metadata), re-signs the assertion, and sends it to
the RP (link 9).
– In GOV.UK Verify, the hub relays the assertion from the
IDP to the matching service (MS) indicated by the RP
(link 8). The MS validates the signature of the IDP and de-
rives a new (locally generated) user pseudonym v that is
equal for all RPs that choose this MS. The MS also verifies
that the locally-generated user pseudonym and attributes
match to a local user account. Finally, the MS re-signs a
new assertion and sends it to the hub (still (link 8)), who
then re-signs the assertion and sends it to the RP (link 9).
User limitation. A main design constraint in FCCX and
GOV.UK Verify is that the role of the user-agent (a web
browser) in the protocol is substantially passive. The active
participation of the user is limited to requesting a resource
from the RP, selecting an IDP (from a list) and authenticat-
ing to the IDP. Communications between the RP and the hub,
and between the IDP and the hub, are passively redirected
through the user, e.g., using Web browser SSO HTTP POST
[31]. The relayed authentication requests and assertions use
a “SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile” and are signed by
the originator and encrypted for the intended recipient. Chan-
nel security, for communications with the RP, hub and IDP, is
based on SSL/TLS [23]. Overall, these mechanisms prevent
network observers and the user from viewing the exchanged
user pseudonyms and attributes, and/or otherwise trivial mes-
sage manipulation attacks.
Out-of-scope alternatives. Privacy aside, linking to a user ac-
count at the RP could be achieved by a direct connection be-
tween RPs and IDPs (i.e., intermediated by a passive user),
as accomplished with OpenID Connect [32]. However, this
would not hide the IDP and RP from one another, which is
a main explicit goal in the FCCX and GOV.UK Verify context.
Alternatively, using group signatures and anonymous creden-
tials [24] would allow IDPs to sign assertions that RPs could
validate as signed by an entity from within a specified group,
but without knowing who. However, on its own, this approach
would not provide a privacy-preserving way to transform user
pseudonyms between the IDP and the RP and, without an ex-
ternal broker, would require more user involvement to medi-
ate the communication between the IDP and RP. A group-
signature based approach would also require group member-
ship management and/or a mechanism for detection and isola-
tion of compromised IDPs that could otherwise taint the trust
in the system.
More interesting solutions would be possible if the user
could actively aid the brokering between IDP and RP, e.g., us-
ing cryptographic protocols based on privacy-enhancing tech-
nologies. It could take advantage of a trusted setup, e.g.,
tamper-resistant trusted hardware and/or open-source software
authenticated by a party trusted by the user (as already happens
when choosing a web browser). This approach may provide a
promising alternative to the designs imposed by FCCX and
GOV.UK Verify. However, our goal in this paper is to present
the actual FCCX and GOV.UK Verify mechanisms and then
show that their privacy and security problems can be repaired
within their own design constraints.
3 System properties
The available FCCX and GOV.UK Verify documentation is
incomplete in several aspects. The FCCX solicitation partially
describes certain desirable privacy and security properties, but
does not specify the transaction protocol. The GOV.UK Verify
specification defines protocol steps in more detail, but we also
do not find a well-defined list of desired properties. Therefore,
we need to infer, from their public descriptions, a set of prop-
erties that they seemingly intend to achieve (§3.1).
The privacy and security of FCCX and GOV.UK Verify
rely on a fully honest and uncompromisable hub. In contrast,
we argue that a good solution should be resilient even when the
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hub is curious (about what it sees) and/or malicious (about the
actions it takes). In other words, we consider two types of cor-
rupted parties: honest-but-curious (i.e., acting honestly during
transactions, but curious to derive information from the ob-
served communications) and malicious (capable of deviating
from the protocol specification). This gives rise to a number of
additional desirable properties beyond those inferred from the
two analyzed systems (§3.2).
A good protocol should also be resilient against mali-
cious collusion, e.g., between RPs, or between RP(s) and the
hub. However, to satisfy forensic requirements, certain special
cases of collusions (e.g., hub+IDP, or hub+IDP+RP) may be
legitimately allowed to reverse certain privacy properties, e.g.,
unlinkability, under very well-defined circumstances such as a
specific court order targeting a given individual. Regrettably,
in both FCCX and GOV.UK Verify, the forensic capabilities
of the hub as currently described could be abused and enable
undetected mass surveillance.
Table 1 summarizes shortcomings of FCCX and GOV.UK
Verify in fulfilling a number of these properties. The ap-
proaches proposed in this paper show that a different outcome
can be achieved without dramatic design changes. We con-
sider several aspects of unlinkability, as well as privacy of at-
tributes, authenticity (i.e., resilience to impersonation), one-to-
one traceability and selective forensic disclosure.
We discuss “unlinkability” associated with user
pseudonyms, ignoring linkability related to side-channel infor-
mation, such as timestamps and IP addresses. Their mitigation
can be addressed in a lower-level specification and/or by pru-
dent implementation guidelines and/or techniques outside of
the scope of the system (see Appendix B).
3.1 Inferred properties
Authenticity. Upon completion of a transaction, the relying
party (RP) is assured that it has established a session with the
user from whom it holds a fresh claim, and that the claims
are valid (namely the user pseudonym v and attributes). A
“session” can mean, for instance, a TLS/SSL encrypted tun-
nel. The root of trust for authenticity rests with the identify
providers (IDPs) and with the hub or matching service (MS).
Specifically, the hub/MSs trusts the authentication assertions
received from IDPs and ATPs; the RP trusts the authentication
assertions received by the hub/MS. In GOV.UK Verify the RP
chooses which MS to trust, whereas in FCCX there is a sin-
gle hub in which to rely. However, we will show that in both
systems the authenticity can be broken by a malicious hub.
Edge unlinkability within a transaction. A key idea behind
(privacy-preserving) brokered identification is to shield the







Edge unlinkability within a transaction:
RP identity is hidden from IDP NO YES YES 1
IDP identity is hidden from RP NO YES YES 2




— NO YES (§5.1.1) 3
hub/MS cannot link
user across IDPs
— Y/N∗ NO YES (§5.1.3) 4
Strong hub cannot link user
across transactions
— NO YES (§5.1.2) 5
Change of RP is
hidden from IDP
NO YES YES 6
Edge Change of IDP is
hidden from RP
NO N/Y∗ NO YES (§5.1.3) 7
Colluding RPs can-
not link pseudonyms
YES† YES NO‡ YES (§5.1.4) 8
Other properties:
Atttribute privacy from hub — NO# YES (§5.2) 9
Authenticity if malicious hub — NO YES (§5.3) 10
One-to-one traceability — NO YES (§5.4) 11
Selective forensic disclosure∥ — NO YES (§5.4) 12
Table 1. Properties across types of solutions. Legend: “YES” is
good for privacy; the two alternatives in cell B4 (Y=Yes or N∗=No)
are entangled with the complementary alternatives in cell B7 (N or
Y∗) – the second alternative (∗) results from an optional account
linking functionality [35]; cell A8 (†) assumes that the IDP sends
different user pseudonyms to different RPs; cell C8 (‡) considers
RPs that have chosen the same MS; in cell BC9 (#), privacy is bro-
ken even if the hub is honest-but-curious; in line 12 (∥), the property
is meant in opposition to total disclosure by default.
“edges” of the authentication system (i.e., IDPs and RPs) from
knowing about each other. We say that the system has edge
unlinkability within a transaction if: (i) the IDP does not learn
about who is the RP and MS; (ii) the RP does not learn about
which IDP authenticated the user; and (iii, iv) the IDP and RP
do not learn about the user pseudonyms at the other party.
In spite of edge unlinkability, in FCCX and GOV.UK Ver-
ify the hub knows who is the IDP and RP in each transaction;
it is unclear to us if in GOV.UK Verify the MS knows who the
RP is, but it knows the IDP.
Traceability. If an auditor challenges the legitimacy of an ac-
tion taken by a party, with respect to a transaction, then the
party should be able to justify it based on a verifiable preced-
ing action. Specifically, for each authentication request sent
from the hub to the IDP, the hub must have a respective re-
quest signed by the RP; for each authentication assertion sent
from the IDP to the hub, the IDP must have a respective re-
quest signed by the hub; for each assertion sent from the hub
to the RP, the hub must have a respective assertion signed by
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the IDP; and for each user login at an RP, the RP must have a
respective assertion signed by the hub.
While not explicitly discussed in the design documents,
we infer the intention of traceability from the use of signatures
in the proposed FCCX and GOV.UK Verify systems. Trace-
ability is useful toward allowing auditability of the behavior
of each isolated party. However, it is possible to achieve trace-
ability more meaningfully than in FCCX and GOV.UK Verify,
namely to promote better accountability. Specifically, we sug-
gest solutions that achieve one-to-one traceability; e.g., if the
hub justifies one authentication request or assertion on the ba-
sis of another authentication request or assertion, then such
justification is the only one possible.
3.2 Additional desirable properties
Unlinkability by the hub. The hub should not be able to link
the same user across different transactions. Since the hub is
part of the brokered identification system, this property is re-
quired to satisfy the notion intended by NIST: “unlinkability
assures that two or more related events in an information-
processing system cannot be related to each other” [29]. Also,
NSTIC requirements include that “organizations shall mini-
mize data aggregation and linkages across transactions” [30,
Req. 5], and IDAP principles state that “no relationships be-
tween parties or records should be established without the con-
sent of the Service User.” [33, Principle 7.5]. We consider two
weaker nuances and a strong notion:
– Weak unlinkability across RPs: the hub cannot link transac-
tions of the same user (as defined by an account at an IDP)
across different RPs. Since a user account at the IDP can
be used to access many RPs, the user pseudonym defined
by the IDP can be considered a global persistent identifier
and thus should not be learned by the hub. Neither FCCX
nor GOV.UK Verify satisfy this. In the UK, allowing global
persistent identifiers conflicts with the political sensitivities
that arguably lead to the rejection of identity cards [5]. In the
US, NSTIC specifically calls for “privacy-enhancing tech-
nology that ... minimizes the ability to link credential use
among multiple RPs” [30, Req. 5].
– Weak unlinkability across IDPs: the hub or MS cannot link
different transactions facilitated by different user accounts
at one or more IDPs leading to the same user account at a
given RP. In GOV.UK Verify such linkage is performed by
default by the MS (chosen by the RP), based on the user
attributes. The user thus does not control who has the abil-
ity to link, nor when to allow linking—a clear privacy de-
ficiency. FCCX offers, via an optional account linking fea-
ture, a tradeoff: endow the hub with the capability of linka-
bility across IDPs, in exchange for allowing authentication
to each RP from different accounts at IDPs. We will show
that this tradeoff can be avoided.
– Strong unlinkability: the hub cannot link transactions where
the same user account at an IDP is being used to access the
same user account at an RP. Neither FCCX nor GOV.UK
Verify satisfy this property.
Edge unlinkability across transactions. We earlier discussed
edge unlinkability within a transaction; the notion can be ex-
tended across transactions as follows:
– Across two transactions with the same user account at an
IDP: the IDP does not learn whether the accessed RP has
changed or not. This property can be inferred from the
FCCX and GOV.UK Verify designs.
– Across two transactions with the same user account at a RP:
the RP does not learn whether the assisting IDP has changed
or not. This property is achieved in FCCX when using an
“account linking” option, but with a privacy tradeoff (which
we will show how to avoid);
– Across transactions with the same user account at an IDP
but different RPs: (i) several colluding RPs cannot the same
user based on their lists of user pseudonyms; (ii) if several
RPs colluding together know, from an external source, that
respective user pseudonyms correspond to the same user,
they are still not able to predict anything about the user
pseudonym at another RP. This is satisfied in FCCX, but
not in GOV.UK Verify where different RPs (that have cho-
sen the same MS) receive the same user pseudonym.
Attribute privacy. The visibility of personal identifiable in-
formation, namely attributes, should be reduced to the bare
minimum necessary for the purpose of each party and as con-
sented by the respective user. For example, relying parties
should learn nothing more than necessary and requested (e.g.,
an age predicate, instead of a date of birth). We are convey-
ing that there should exist capability to deal with predicates of
attributes, but the actual definition of what is “necessary” is
outside the scope of our system model. As for the hub, since
its role is to help the interoperability of transactions, suppos-
edly without interest about user information, it should not have
visibility into the attributes being exchanged or verified. This
is required by the FCCX procurement, but is not currently
achieved [17, Q&A 2.3]. The GOV.UK Verify specification
simply defines a protocol where the hub and MS have visi-
bility of attributes. In GOV.UK Verify the MS explicitly uses
some attributes to help link the user into a local account.
Resilience against impersonation. In spite of the trust placed
in the hub to broker a transaction, a maliciously compromised
hub should not be able to break authenticity. It should not be
able to gain access to a (honest) user account at a (honest) RP.
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However, we will show that in FCCX and GOV.UK Verify a
compromised hub is able to impersonate users.
Selective forensic disclosure. NSTIC [30, Req. 22] and IDAP
[33, Princ. 9] contain provisions about forensic capabilities
and exceptional circumstances. They consider “forensic capa-
bilities to ... permit attribution” and possible “exemption from
...[other] Principles that [the exemption] relates to the process-
ing of personal data” if “necessary and justifiable in terms of”
foreseen exceptions to the “Right to respect for private and
family life” [14]. With this in mind, a desirable property might
be to have the ability to do a limited reversal of weak or strong
unlinkability (or attribute privacy) in special cases where a
subset of entities are compelled to aid in an adequate inves-
tigation, e.g., upon being served a subpoena.
Assume the hub pinpoints a transaction related to a certain
triplet (IDP, user, RP1), where we mean “user” as defined by
u. We envisage two types of selective forensic disclosure:
– Coarse-grained. Compelled collaboration of the IDP may
allow the hub to gain full linkability of past (logged) trans-
actions of the selected user with any RP (i.e., pinpoint all
such transactions), but without affecting the unlinkability
of other users.
– Fine-grained. Compelled collaboration of the IDP and
some RP2 with the hub may allow the hub to pinpoint past
(logged) transactions of the same user with this RP2, but (i)
without IDP learning who is RP1 and RP2, (ii) without the
hub learning about any other transactions of the user with
any RP other than RP2, and (iii) without breaking unlink-
ability of other users. In other words, edge unlinkability is
preserved and weak unlinkability is selectively broken to in-
vestigate a user in connection to one or several selected RPs,
without leakage about interactions with other RPs. If RP1 is
RP2, then the IDP does not need to collaborate.
In sharp contrast, in FCCX and GOV.UK Verify both
types of leakage happen by default and without any need for
collaboration. This is a serious vulnerability, and could open
the way to undetected mass surveillance.
4 Inferred protocols
The high-level protocol flow of a transaction in FCCX and
GOV.UK Verify was depicted in Fig. 1. In Fig. 3 we describe
the respective steps in more detail.
To simplify, we leave implicit some elements of metadata
and omit verifications that must be done at each party.
1. Start. The user requests a resource from the RP (1).
2. Initial authentication request. The RP selects a SAML
identification number (ID) n (2), and uses SAML syntax to
build an authentication (“authN” in the figure) request, also
containing (not shown) the required level of assurance and
other metadata. In GOV.UK Verify the RP also specifies the
MS (3). The RP signs the request and sends it encrypted to
the hub, via user redirection (4).
3. Select IDP. The hub asks the user to select an IDP (5).
4. Relay authentication request. The hub prepares a new
authentication request, removing metadata that could iden-
tify the RP. In FCCX it is not clear if the request ID (n′) of
the new request is equal to the one (n) received from the RP
(6) (e.g., to prevent it from being used as a covert-channel
from RP to IDP). In GOV.UK Verify, this ID number does
not change (7) – it will be visible by all parties (except the
user) across the transaction. The hub signs the new request
and sends it encrypted to the IDP, via user redirection (8).
5. Authenticate user at IDP. The IDP and user perform an
arbitrary (possibly multi-round) authentication protocol (9).
6. Initial authentication assertion. The IDP determines a
pseudo-random user pseudonym u, persistently associated
with the local user account (and none other), and defined
specifically for brokered transactions with this hub (10).
Next, the IDP builds an authentication assertion that includes
the authentication request ID (n’), the user pseudonym (u),
some attribute values (atts) and some contextual information
(ctx: the level of assurance, authentication type and other
transient attributes such as the IP address of the user) (11).
We comment in Appendix A about the set of default attributes
in FCCX and GOV.UK Verify. The IDP signs and encrypts
the assertion and sends it to the hub via user redirection (12).
The hub can view all the data in the assertion, including the
user pseudonym (u) defined by the IDP and the attributes.
7. Attribute enrichment. Depending on the authentication
request from RP (and assuming user consent), the transaction
may involve integration of attributes obtained from several
ATPs (13). We consider here a case where such integration is
not needed and defer further comments to Appendix A.
8. Matching to local account (only in GOV.UK Verify).
8a. The hub signs the assertion a0 received from the IDP, and
sends encrypted to the MS (chosen by RP) the assertion and
the two signatures (by the hub and by the IDP) (14). This
is sent directly, using SAML SOAP binding, rather than via
user redirection.
8b. The MS then “locally generates” a user pseudonym (v),
as the SHA256-hash of the concatenation of the IDP identi-
fier, the MS identifier and u (15). The MS then uses v to try
to find a match to a local account identifier (vLm) unique to
the user. If a match is not found, then the MS attempts to find
a match based on the provided matching data set attributes (a
default set of attributes defined by GOV.UK Verify) (16). If
a match is still not found (and if one was not required), then
the MS may create a “temporary” local identifier (vLm). The
MS then updates the mapping that it maintains between iden-
Brought to you by | UCL - University College London
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/26/15 1:58 PM
Toward Mending Two Nation-Scale Brokered Identification Systems 142
1. user→ RP ∶ request resource (1)
2. RP ∶ n← SAML ID (2)
RP ∶ c = {n} (authN request) (3)
RPù hub ∶ Ehub (c, σRP(c)) (4)
3. hub↔ user ∶ Select IDP (5)
4. FCCX hub ∶ n′ ←? n; c′ = {n′} (authN request) (6)
GOV.UK hub ∶ n′ = n; c′ = {n′} (authN request) (7)
hubù IDP ∶ EIDP(c′, σhub(c′)) (8)
5. IDP↔ user(uID) ∶ arbitrary authN protocol (9)
6. IDP ∶ u← GetPseudonym(uLi, hub) (10)
IDP ∶ a0 = {n′, u, atts, ctx} (authN assertion) (11)
IDPù hub ∶ Ehub (a0, σIDP(a0)) (12)
7. hub↔ ATPs ∶ (optional) attribute enrichment (13)
8. Only in GOV.UK Verify:
8a. GOV.UK hub→MS ∶ EMS(a0, σIDP(a0), σhub(a0)) (14)
8b. MS ∶ v = Hash(IDP,MS, u) (15)
MS ∶ vLm ← Findmatch(v, atts) (16)
MS ∶ Store((vLm,v)) (17)
MS ∶ a1 = {n, v, atts, ctx} (authN assertion) (18)
MS→ GOV.UK hub ∶ Ehub(a1, σMS(a1)) (19)
9. FCCX hub ∶ v ← GetPseudonym(u,RP) (20)
FCCX hub ∶ a1 = {n, v, atts, ctx} (authN assertion) (21)
FCCX hubù RP ∶ ERP (a1, σhub(a1)) (22)
9. GOV.UK hubù RP ∶ ERP(a1, σhub(a1), σMS(a1)) (23)
10. RP ∶ vLr ← Findmatch(a1) (24)
RP→ user ∶ response (25)
Fig. 3. Inferred protocols. Legend: x→ y (message sent from x to y); xù y (message sent from x to y via a user redirection); x↔ y
(interaction between x and y); x ←? y (x is obtained from y, after some (unspecified) transformation); {...} message with SAML-syntax
(leaving implicit certain meta-data); σx(z) (signature of content z by entity x); Ex(z) (encryption of content z, using the public key of x).
tifiers, storing if necessary the pair (vLm,v) (17), and builds
an assertion including the authentication-request ID n, the lo-
cally generated v (associated with the user account at IDP),
the attributes atts and the context ctx (18). The MS signs the
assertion and sends it encrypted to the hub (19).1
9. Relay authentication assertion In FCCX, the hub directly
converts the pseudonym received from the IDP into a
pseudonym for the RP (different and persistent for each RP)
(v) (20). The hub then uses v, instead of u, to build a new
assertion a1 for the RP (21). The hub re-signs the assertion,
encrypts it and sends it to the RP via user redirection (22).
In GOV.UK Verify, the hub can view all the data in the asser-
tion received from MS, including the new user pseudonym.
The hub re-signs the assertion, encrypts it and sends it to RP,
along with the signature from the MS (23).
10. Final response The RP processes the assertion received
from the hub, possibly finding a local identifier for the user
account (24). Finally, the RP responds to the user, possibly
granting or denying access to the requested resource (25).
1 The MS is sending to the hub a pseudonym v that does not vary with the
RP; we ponder if instead it might have been intended that the MS would
send a pseudonym derived from vLm, independently of IDP. As described,
the local matching performed by MS (16-17) has no obvious advantage
to RP. We will show that a better alternative is possible (§5.1.3). The MS
also appears to store user attributes (not shown in the figure), since it needs
them when matching is not possible based only on the pseudonym u.
5 Problems and solutions
We show that in FCCX and GOV.UK Verify a corrupt hub may
violate with impunity many of the properties defined in §3.
5.1 Linkability of same-user transactions
5.1.1 Weak unlinkability across RPs
In FCCX and GOV.UK Verify, the hub has full visibility of the
user pseudonym (u) defined by the IDP. Thus, the hub—and
whoever can gain control over it, legitimately or not—can link
transactions of the same user, as defined by a user account at an
IDP, across different RPs. This gives the hub excessive visibil-
ity into the activities of all users. It also violates the selective
forensic disclosure property, by allowing linkability without
the help of the respective IDPs or RPs. Even if there are provi-
sions about not storing some data (e.g., in GOV.UK Verify), a
system should be at least secure in a honest-but-curious adver-
sarial model, where seeing is equivalent to storing. In FCCX,
the hub is supposed to log activities related to all transaction
steps for at least one year online and 7.5 years offline [35]. In
any case, we advocate that clear information should be made
public about existing security-related logging.
We propose a solution for weak unlinkability (by the
hub) across RPs, involving interaction between IDP and the
hub. The solution is directly applicable to FCCX, but not to
GOV.UK Verify where the user pseudonym is transformed by
the MS. Anyway, we propose that the GOV.UK Verify struc-
ture be changed to integrate our solution, since we also show
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(§5.3) that the MS does not ensure authenticity against a mali-
cious hub, and poses additional threats against unlinkability.
5.1.1.1 Initial intuition
Linkability by the hub of user pseudonyms across RPs
can be avoided by hiding u from the hub, and with the hub
learning v (the user pseudonym to send to RP) as a pseudo-
random value. The pseudonym v is persistent for each pair(u, r), where r is defined by the hub as an identifier of the RP
for interactions with the IDP. Also, the IDP must not learn any-
thing about r and v. This is an instance of a secure-two-party
computation (S2PC), where the hub learns a function of com-
bined inputs but neither hub nor IDP learn the input or output
of the other. The IDP provides u as input; the hub provides r
as input and receives v as output. The function can be a block
cipher, with the key being the user pseudonym u held by the
IDP, and with the plaintext being the RP identifier r held by
the hub. By definition, the output v = Cipheru(r) of a secure
block cipher is indistinguishable from random, if the key (u)
is random. The RP identifier r must be unpredictable by the
IDP so that the output v is also unpredictable by the IDP.
For example, (Yao-protocol-based) S2PC of the AES
block-cipher is a de facto standard benchmark in S2PC re-
search [12]. The respective circuit requires 6,800 garbed gates
[7], which is about 13 times less than for a SHA256 circuit.
Recent techniques allow a significant amortization of the com-
putational complexity of S2PC in a multiple execution set-
ting, i.e., when evaluating many times the same circuit, and
allowing various tradeoffs between offline and online phases
[18, 27]; this applies here as the hub and each IDP are involved
in many transactions. Recent work also shows how to mini-
mize the number of communication rounds [1]. Other block-
ciphers may have circuit designs that enable even more effi-
cient S2PC implementations [2].
While a S2PC-AES execution is slower than a simple ex-
change of signatures, available benchmarks show that it can
be achieved under a second [16]. Furthermore, after the user
authenticates to the IDP, the IDP and the hub can execute the
S2PC “behind the scenes,” without user intervention. In other
words, the added latency is unlikely to add a considerable us-
ability burden. Even if S2PC-AES may not be a perfect solu-
tion to achieve weak unlinkability across RPs, it is a proof-of-
possibility demonstrating that weak unlinkability is achievable
within the imposed constraints and thus ought to be required
in privacy-preserving brokered identification systems.
Adding traceability. To achieve traceability, the IDP should
also sign an assertion that allows the hub to justify subse-
quent actions related to v in this transaction. While theoreti-
cally this could be achieved by embedding a signature calcu-
lation within the generic S2PC module, it would prohibitively
increase the cost of the computation. To avoid this, we pro-
pose a way in which signatures can be computed outside of
the S2PC module. Each party signs and receives a signature of
commitments that hide and bind the parties to the respective
inputs used and the outputs obtained in the S2PC. For exam-
ple, given the secrecy constraints, the IDP does not sign the
unknown pseudonym v, but rather a commitment efficiently
obtained in the S2PC. The commitment hides v from the IDP,
but binds the hub to the value, preventing association with any
other value. The process is also applied to the inputs of both
parties, to commit the hub to a RP identifier (r), and to commit
the IDP to the user pseudonym (u). These commitments need
not be opened, except in an eventual audit that so requires.
The needed commitments can be obtained by a special-
ized S2PC protocol that directly provides commitments of the
inputs and outputs of both parties (e.g., [6]). However, in the
interest of generality, below we also propose an alternative
applicable to any generic S2PC protocol of Boolean circuits.
The devised mechanism combines (any type of) cryptographic
commitments, computed prior to the S2PC module, with the
S2PC of a circuit augmented with efficient randomize-then-
mask operations (⊗-then-⊕). In this approach, a party may
still use in the S2PC inputs different from those committed,
but traceability is not affected because an audit would detect
an inconsistency with overwhelming probability.
Below, we sketch a protocol with three stages: (i) pro-
duce cryptographic commitments (C), prior to the S2PC;
(ii) execute S2PC of a block-cipher circuit augmented
with randomize-then-mask operations; (iii) sign the obtained
masked values, after the S2PC. We then give a step-by-step
description, as depicted in Fig. 4, for simplicity omitting some
metadata necessary in a concurrent setting, and some verifica-
tions (e.g, message syntax, expected values and signatures).
5.1.1.2 Protocol sketch and further intuition
1. Commitments. Each party cryptographically commits to
her inputs and to several random masks (or “blinding fac-
tors”), i.e. bit-strings created to obfuscate other bit-strings.
2. S2PC. The hub and IDP engage in a S2PC, where each
party learns masked versions (“maskings”) of the input and
output of both parties. The maskings are defined so that
their result is not predictable before the S2PC. We achieve
this with a ⊗-randomize then ⊕-mask operation, with con-
tributions (randomizer and mask) from both parties, for
suitable ⊗ and ⊕ binary operations. The ⊗-then-⊕ some-
what resembles a one-time message authentication code.
Essentially, any inconsistency between the values used in
Brought to you by | UCL - University College London
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/26/15 1:58 PM
Toward Mending Two Nation-Scale Brokered Identification Systems 144
the S2PC and the values previously committed is detectable
in an audit action that requires opening the commitments.
3. Signatures. After the S2PC, the hub sends to IDP a signa-
ture of all maskings from both the hub and IDP. The IDP
then reciprocates with a signature of the same elements,
and by opening one of the two masks that was blinding the
final output v of the hub (who knows the other mask).
Input masking. As an example, let u be the original private
input of the IDP. We augment the protocol so that the IDP
can later prove to an auditor that u was indeed an input of the
S2PC. As a first step, prior to the S2PC, the IDP produces and
sends a commitment χu ←$ C(u, γu) to the hub, where γu is
a secret ⊕-mask. The commitment binds the IDP to the val-
ues u and γu, while hiding them from the hub. Then, let the
IDP maliciously use values u∗ and γ∗u as input in the S2PC,
where (u∗, γ∗u) ≠ (u, γu) (i.e., one or both elements are dif-
ferent). Then, let the S2PC (besides the original computation
that it was supposed to do) also compute and reveal the value
δu = (u∗⊗βu)⊕γ∗u , where βu, used as auxiliary input by the
hub, is a ⊗-randomizer also revealed as an auxiliary output of
the S2PC. In other words: the party that knows an input value
to be committed in the S2PC selects an ⊕-mask, whereas the
other party selects an ⊗-randomizer; then, the S2PC reveals
the overall masking (δ) and the randomizer (β) to both parties,
but neither the mask (γ) nor the committed value. As part of
the overall protocol, both parties are then compelled to sign the
values δu, βu and χu, i.e., only if obtained from a successful
S2PC. The properties of ⊕ (e.g., bit-wise XOR) and ⊗ (e.g.,
multiplication in an adequate Galois field of characteristic 2)
are chosen such that, for any u, γu and δu, if β is sampled uni-
formly at random, the probability that (u ⊗ β) ⊕ γu is equal
to δu is negligible.2 Thus, if the IDP is audited, it will with
overwhelming probability be caught cheating.
Assume that u has κ bits (e.g., 128). While ⊗ could be
multiplication in a field of order 2κ, it can be simplified to
a randomized hash function Hβ(x) = x ⊗ β, indexed by β,
e.g., selecting a function from a universal hash family H. It is
enough to have the collision probability, which determines the
binding property, be negligible in an acceptable statistical pa-
rameter σ, e.g., 40 bits. Thus, the hash may compress the input
into, say, 40 bits. We leave for future work possible protocol
adjustments that may reduce the burden imposed by concrete
implementations of ⊗.
Output masking. The method is slightly different for com-
mitting an output, namely v for the Hub, because it cannot be
2 In particular, this implies that ⊗ and ⊕ are non-commutative, assum-
ing that ⊕ is not collision-resistant in respect to the pair of inputs, i.e.,
assuming that it is feasible to find values such that x⊕ γ = x∗ ⊕ γ∗.
committed prior to the S2PC. Instead, the protocol outputs for
both parties a double ⊕-masking of v, as well as commitments
to each such mask. Each party (IDP and hub) knows one such
mask, which is used as an augmented input of the S2PC. Later,
once the IDP reveals one mask and proves it correct, the hub
(who knows the other mask) learns v. Since both parties sign
the masking and the commitments of the respective masks, the
hub can prove to an auditor the value v, namely because it
can also prove, by the method described for inputs, the cor-
rect value of the masks. This scheme ensures that the hub only
learns v after sending a respective signature to the IDP.
Security properties. Unlinkability follows directly from the
hiding properties of the commitment schemes, of the ⊕-
maskings and the block cipher. By the S2PC properties, the
IDP learns nothing about v or r. By the pseudo-randomness of
a block-cipher with a random secret key, the hub learns noth-
ing about u. Traceability for each party follows from the sig-
nature by the other party, containing values that the party can
prove being unequivocally associated with only one particular
input and/or output. Specifically, in a later audit phase, a party
may open the ⊕-mask to an auditor, to allow verifiable un-
masking of an input used and/or output received in the S2PC.
Since the ⊗-randomizers lead to unpredictable values being
masked, the commitment of values different from those used
in the S2PC would lead to an inconsistent verification.
5.1.1.3 Detailed procedure
Initial inputs. The hub and the IDP agree on a session identi-
fier (26). (See §C for a possible mechanism.) The private input
of the IDP is a user pseudonym u, obtained after user authen-
tication. The private input of the hub is an RP identifier r (27).
Randomizers, masks and commitments. Each party (hub
and IDP) selects random elements as follows (28-29): a ⊕-
mask (α and α′) for the final output v of the hub; a ⊗-
randomizer (β) for each original input (u, r) of the other party
and for each ⊕-mask (α and α′) of the final output of the hub;
a ⊕-mask (γ) to apply to their own ⊗-randomized elements.
For the purpose of this description, the ⊕-masks α and α′ are
hereafter also considered respective inputs of the hub and IDP.
Then, for each input of each party (r and α for the hub; u and
α′ for the IDP), the party cryptographically commits to the
value and to the respective ⊕-mask (γ). (30-31). Except for
the commitment χα′ of the ⊕-mask used as input by the IDP,
which will only temporarily ⊕-mask the output of the hub, the
other commitments (χu, χr, χα) will not be opened within
this protocol. They might (eventually) be opened later, to an
auditor that requires knowing the values used in the S2PC.
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S2PC. The parties then engage in a S2PC, having as respective
inputs the original private inputs (u, r) of the protocol and the
selected random values (32). The S2PC internally computes:
Common input: n′, σhub({n′}) (session ID) (26)
Initial private input ∶ IDP[u], hub[r] (27)
Procedure:
IDP ∶ ρI = (γu, βr, βα, (α′, γα′))←$ {0,1}3σ+κ+σ (28)
hub ∶ ρH = (βu, γr, (α, γα), βα′)←$ {0,1}2σ+κ+2σ (29)
(Only α and α′ have length κ; the others have length σ)
hub→ IDP ∶ χr ←$ C(r, γr), χα ←$ C(α, γα) (30)
IDP→ hub ∶ χu ←$ C(u, γu), χα′ ←$ C(α′, γα′) (31)
S2PC start: IDP[u, ρI]↔ hub[r, ρH] (32)
δu = (u⊗ βu)⊕ γu (⊗ed-⊕ed input of IDP) (33)
δr = (r ⊗ βr)⊕ γr (⊗ed-⊕ed input of hub) (34)
δα = (α⊗ βα)⊕ γα (⊗ed-⊕ed 1st⊕-mask for output of hub) (35)
δα′ = (α′ ⊗ βα′)⊕ γα′ (⊗ed-⊕ed 2nd⊕-mask for output of hub) (36)
∆ ≡ (δu, δr, δα, δα′) (37)
v′ = BlockCipheru(r)⊕ α⊕ α′ (⊕ed-⊕ed output of hub) (38)
S2PC end: IDP[∆, βu, βα′ , v′], hub[∆, βr, βα, v′] (39)
IDP, hub ∶ X ≡ (χu, χr, χα, χα′),B ≡ (βu, βr, βα, βα′) (40)
hub→ IDP ∶ sH = σhub(w ≡ (n′,X,B,∆, v′)) (41)
IDP→ hub ∶ oα′ = O[χα′ ](α′, γα′), sI = σIDP(w, oα′) (42)
hub ∶ (α′ ⊗ βα′)⊕ γα′ =? δα′ ; v = v′ ⊕ α′ ⊕ α (43)
Final output ∶ IDP[ρI , sH , sI ,w], hub[ρH , sH , sI ,w, oα′ , v] (44)
Fig. 4. Protocol for weak-unlinkability across RPs, with trace-
ability. Legend: n’ (session ID); u (user pseudonym at IDP, for inter-
action with the hub); r (RP identifier at the hub, for interaction with
IDP); α and α′ (⊕-masks of length κ); β (⊗-randomizer of length σ);
γ (⊕-mask of length σ, used to hide a ⊗-randomized value); ρp (list
of random values selected by p); χ (commitment); σp (signature by
p); κ and σ (computational and statistical security parameters, re-
spectively, e.g., κ = 128 and σ = 40; assume ∣u∣ = ∣r∣ = ∣v∣ = κ);
in the ⊗-randomization operation, the left and right arguments have
respective lengths κ and σ; ←$ C (assignment from randomized
commitment functionality); O[χ](x) (opening of value x from com-
mitment χ – includes randomness used to commit).
– for each input (u, r,α,α′) of each party, the ⊗-
randomization (using the randomizer known by the other
party) followed by the ⊕-masking (using the mask known
by the respective party) (33-36). The sequence of four
maskings is denoted by ∆ (37).
– the double⊕-masking of the user pseudonym (v) to be even-
tually learned by the hub (38).
Both parties learn the input maskings (∆), the ⊗-randomizers
(β) of the other party, and the double ⊕-masking of v (39).
Exchange signatures. At this point, both hub and IDP know
the same four commitments (X) and four β-randomizers (B)
(40). The hub signs the concatenation of all commonly known
information (41) and sends the signature to the IDP (41). Once
the IDP verifies that the signature is correct (not shown), it has
assured traceability for itself. The IDP then opens the ⊕-mask
α′ and the respective ⊕-mask γα, concatenates the opening
(including the randomness necessary to prove a correct open-
ing) to the commonly known information and sends a respec-
tive signature to the hub (42). The hub verifies the correct-
ness of the signature (not shown), and that the opened values(α′, γα′) are correct against the respect masking δα′ and ran-
domizer βα′ . The hub then removes the two masks (α and α′)
from the masked output v′ to obtain the user pseudonym v for
the RP (43).
As final output, each party stores all the random values
that may be needed to open the commitments in case of an au-
dit, the exchanged signatures, and all other exchanged values.
The hub also stores v (44), which is needed for the subsequent
interaction with RP.
Basic audit example. Consider an authentication assertion
sent from the hub to the RP (22), containing a pseudonym
v and a session ID n. If an auditor challenges the hub about
this transaction, the hub can prove correctness of behavior as
follows. First, it shows the respective assertion signed by the
IDP (42), which (among other elements) contains a different
session ID n′, the cryptographic commitments χ of inputs, the
maskings-of-randomizations δ, and the randomizers β. Sec-
ond, the hub proves a correct relation between the two session
IDs (e.g., based on the traceability solution discussed in Ap-
pendix C), and that the IDP is the expected one. Third, the hub
opens the ⊕-mask α, and the respective ⊕-mask γα from χα
(29). This allows the auditor to verify that (α⊗βα)⊕γα = δα
(35), and then to verify that v′ = v ⊕ α ⊕ α′, where v is the
value claimed by the hub, and where α′, v′, δα and βα have
all been signed by the IDP.
Concrete primitives. The optimal primitives may depend on
envisioned audit cases and efficiency tradeoffs. For example,
for IDP to prove that in two transactions the pseudonym u is
the same (or different), but without revealing the committed
pseudonym(s), it may be useful for the commitments (C) to
be based on group operations (e.g., Pedersen commitments).
On the other hand, the specific commitment of (α, γα) can
be more efficiently based on symmetric primitives because
a direct opening is performed within the protocol. Nonethe-
less, if needed it is also possible to prove in zero-knowledge
that certain commitments (χ) are consistent with the signed
maskings (δ) and randomizers (β) (e.g., using zero knowledge
proofs based on garbled circuits [25]). We recommend that en-
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visioned auditability use-cases be made explicit in public doc-
umentation by the FCCX and GOV.UK Verify teams.
Formalizing a solution. While we claim that the above so-
lution is better than what is proposed by FCCX, we believe
that it does not yet reach an adequate level of formaliza-
tion for implementation. First, integration with other proper-
ties, such as with those discussed below, is required, followed
by a proof of security. Second, the exact kind of adversar-
ial scenarios one may want to protect against should be fur-
ther considered. As an example, consider that two different
user-pseudonyms (v1 and v2) at an RP are leaked to public
information, perhaps due to some unintended data breach re-
lated to an audit. Then, the IDP can easily find to which users
they correspond, using the following simple procedure. The
IDP builds two lists t1 = ⟨(u,Cipher−1u (v1)) ∶ u ∈ U⟩ and
t2 = ⟨(u,Cipher−1u (v2)) ∶ u ∈ U⟩, where U is the set of all
user pseudonyms at the IDP. Then the IDP merges the two
lists, sorts the resulting list by the second component of each
pair, and finds the two unique pairs that have an equal sec-
ond component (which is necessarily equal to r, the identi-
fier of RP that should be unpredictable to IDP). It follows
that the respective first components, u1 and u2, are the ex-
act user pseudonyms at the IDP. From here, the IDP can pre-
dict any pseudonym at an RP of a different user at the same
RP. This particular issue does not affect any of the proper-
ties that we have previously defined (§3), but it does not al-
low a gracious failure when there is a leakage of pseudonyms.
While this particular problem can be resolved by instead hav-
ing v = Cipheru⊕v(v), the example conveys the benefits of
further formalization.
5.1.2 Strong unlinkability
In the above proposal for weak unlinkability across RPs, the
hub still knows the user pseudonym (v) sent to the RP, either
by choosing it (in FCCX) (step 20 in Fig. 3) or by learning
the value decided by the MS (in GOV.UK Verify) (step 19).
This allows the hub to link the same user across different
transactions associated with the same RP. In a more privacy-
preserving solution, the hub would never receive a persistent
user pseudonym. This can be solved based on an ephemeral,
secret and random key or mask m, shared between the IDP
and RP and hidden from the hub. It is ephemeral in that it is
generated for a one-time use, i.e., once for each transaction. Its
secrecy can be derived from an appropriate key-exchange pro-
tocol, as suggested in §5.2. Its randomness can be enforced by
the hub, via standard and very efficient two-party coin-flipping
techniques. Then, the hub and IDP implement an S2PC-based
solution, similar in spirit to what we described for weak un-
linkability, but with the following differences (ignoring the
augmentation for traceability): the IDP also inputs the shared
key into the S2PC; the hub inputs into the S2PC an authenti-
cated enciphering of the RP identifier, as received from RP –
calculated by the RP using the shared key; the S2PC deciphers
the RP identifier, if and only if the shared key inputted by the
IDP is the same as the one used by the RP – if the internal ver-
ification fails, then the S2PC outputs an error bit and nothing
else; the hub then learns a masked and authenticated version of
the pseudonym for the RP, instead of the value in clear. Then,
the hub sends the output to the RP, who can verifiably open the
respective persistent pseudonym. The traceability mechanism
can be based on the ⊗-then-⊕ techniques already described.
Full unlinkability requires solving also the case across
IDPs – this is described in §5.1.3, which in turn takes advan-
tage of the solution just described.
5.1.3 Weak unlinkability across IDPs
Multiple options for connection. It may be desirable to let a
user access the same user account at RP via different accounts
at IDPs. This can be achieved after a matching registration
process at each RP, as follows: (i) first, the user connects using
a certain user account at IDP (i.e., a regular transaction); (ii)
then, without disconnecting, the user and the RP proceed to
a new transaction, with the user reconnecting but through a
different account at IDP; (iii) depending on the requisites of
the user account at RP, the RP may perform a matching of user-
attributes to guarantee, with the adequate level of assurance,
that the different connections correspond to the same user; (iv)
if the matching is successful, the RP links the two different
user pseudonyms into the same local identifier. Thereafter, a
transaction through any of the accounts at IDPs leads to the
same account at RP. We notice that this procedure breaks edge
unlinkability in regard to changing IDPs, i.e., the RP knows
when the user is changing IDPs.
As an alternative, in FCCX an “account linking” option is
provided for a user to link different user accounts at IDPs into
a single local account at the hub. It is based on the above regis-
tration procedure, but replacing the RP by the hub. The change
of IDPs is thus automatically hidden from all RPs, because the
user pseudonym that the RP receives from the hub does not
vary with the IDP. However, this solution breaks weak unlink-
ability across IDPs and it is further incompatible with weak
unlinkability across RPs, as it explicitly allows the hub to link
the user to a unique identifier. In other words, in FCCX it is
a required tradeoff to allow the user to connect to the same
account at RP via several different accounts at IDPs.
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In GOV.UK Verify, the MS has the task of matching into a
local account the user pseudonym (u) and user-attributes (atts)
received from the IDP (step 16 in Fig. 3). Thus, by default
the MSs also break weak unlinkability across IDPs, besides
breaking edge unlinkability in regard to RPs that choose the
same MS. Even though the MS is instructed to only save a
hash version of each u, all are linked to a local identifier vLm.
This happens in a compulsory way, without choice by the user.
Our aim. We propose that linkability across different IDPs be
avoided, while at the same time allowing the user to connect
through multiple user accounts at IDPs. Informally, we want
the best of both worlds – a user being able to authenticate to the
same RP through different accounts at IDPs, such that: (i) the
hub cannot link the same user across different transactions; (ii)
the RP does not know whether the same or a different IDP is
being used; (iii) a single matching registration is enough to de-
termine the default behavior for all RPs, but the user can avoid
the feature on a per-connection basis; (iv) the user chooses
which party to trust with the matching operation, instead of
being imposed the hub (in FCCX) or (unknown) MSs chosen
by RPs (in GOV.UK Verify).
Solution description. We consider a new “identity integra-
tion” (II) service. Basically, we propose that the account link-
ing by the hub (in FCCX) and the account matching by
MSs (in GOV.UK Verify) be replaced by a corresponding
II operation performed by another party optionally chosen
by the user. Since the task, involving linking of several user
pseudonyms into a single one, is essentially a component of
identity and attribute management, it is suited to a credential
service provider, such as IDPs and ATPs. For simplicity we
describe it here as being a new party on its own, denoted II.
In a voluntary registration matching process, the user cre-
ates or reconnects to a user account at (a chosen trusted) II to
link several (as many as desired) user accounts at IDPs. (We
notice that such a kind of registration was already required in
FCCX when using account linking.) In this special registration
transaction, and in spite of mediation by the hub, each IDP is
explicitly informed of the identity of the II, so that it can later
refer to it. As a result of the registration transaction with each
IDP, the II (as a RP) learns a user pseudonym associated with
each user account at an IDP, and links it into a local account
identifier. However, the II does not need to learn who are the
IDPs. Also, the II exchanges a persistent and secret key with
each individual user account at IDP.
After a successful registration procedure, automatically if
so desired any transaction involving a registered user account
at IDP may request the hub for a redirection through the II.
Thus, the user may use different accounts at IDP to connect
(via regular hub-brokered transactions) to the same user ac-
count at a RP. The IDP sends to the hub an assertion that con-
tains a flag related to “account matching” and the identity of
the respective II. The hub then communicates directly with the
II, as if it were a RP but without redirection through the user.
Initially as a RP, the II learns a user pseudonym; then as
an IDP it determines the user pseudonym to use with the hub
and it sends a respective assertion to the hub. The hub then
completes the transaction by sending a respective assertion to
the final RP, via a user redirect. However, based on the pro-
posed solution to strong unlinkability, the hub does not get to
learn any user pseudonym. Particularly, the persistent key pre-
shared between the IDP and II allows the IDP to send to II the
ephemeral session key necessary for the remainder transaction
with the RP. Thus, it follows that, contrary to what happens in
FCCX, the hub cannot know if different user accounts at IDPs
are linking or not to the same user account at the II (when act-
ing as a RP). The per-connection flexibility can be achieved by
the IDP offering to the user, in each authentication, the possi-
bility to decide (e.g., a selectable option) whether or not to use
the matching functionality.
In this solution the matching does not need to (but it may)
involve attributes, and only occurs if chosen by the user. Com-
pared with GOV.UK Verify, replacing the MS by the II does
not disadvantage the RP in terms of authenticity – if the sys-
tem is upgraded with resilience against impersonation (§5.3)
and against linkability (§5.1.1, §5.1.2), the MSs are no longer
needed by RPs as an alternative to trusting the hub.
5.1.4 Unlinkability against colluding RPs
In FCCX, each RP receives from the hub a different and un-
correlated user pseudonym v. However, in GOV.UK Verify
such user pseudonym depends only on the MS and on the user
pseudonym at the IDP (step 23 in Fig. 3). In other words, v
does not change with the RP (assuming the same MS). Thus,
two externally colluding RPs (with the same MS) can trivially
link the same user in different transactions across the two RPs.
This can be avoided by letting v vary pseudo-randomly with
the RP. If the MS were to know the RP, which would be detri-
mental to weak unlinkability, a trivial solution would be to cal-
culate v as a value varying with RP. If the MS does not know
the RP, then the user pseudonym could be changed at the hub
(e.g., as we propose in §5.1.1 and §5.1.2, also achieving trace-
ability). In GOV.UK Verify, the protocol is geared towards un-
equivocal identification, not selective disclosure, as it assumes
a matching dataset (MDS) of attributes. Thus, this solution in
isolation (i.e., varying the user pseudonym with the RP) would
not make linkability impossible, but only not easier than what
is already possible without brokered identification.
Brought to you by | UCL - University College London
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/26/15 1:58 PM
Toward Mending Two Nation-Scale Brokered Identification Systems 148
5.2 Visibility of attributes
In FCCX and GOV.UK Verify, the attributes integrated in au-
thentication assertions constitute personally identifiable infor-
mation. In each transaction, the attributes are visible by the
hub and (in GOV.UK Verify) the MS, even though the goal of
the transaction is to connect the user to the RP. We show that
visibility by the hub and/or MSs is completely unnecessary.
Avoid attribute visibility by the MS. In GOV.UK Verify, the
MS performs a matching of user attributes into a local account.
We argue that this is avoidable, by contesting the usefulness of
the MS. A main argument in favor of the MS-based architec-
ture would seemingly be to allow each RP to choose which
MS to trust, instead of having to trust the hub. However, such
argument is void since, as shown in §5.3: (i) in GOV.UK Ver-
ify a malicious hub can still perform impersonation attacks;
(ii) it is possible to achieve resilience against a malicious hub
even without using a MS. Second, user matching based on the
matching dataset of user attributes is not required if the IDP al-
ready possesses those attributes, and is otherwise possible via
attribute enrichment aided by ATPs. So, the user, rather than
the RP, should control which party enables the matching, and
only if and when needed (instead of in every transaction), as
already argued in §5.1.3. This achieves the best of both worlds:
RPs do not have to trust the hub; users can choose which IDPs
to trust, preventing linkability by the MSs.
Share an ephemeral key. To avoid attribute visibility by the
hub, the IDP can encrypt the attributes under a cryptographic
key known by the RP. However, to ensure edge unlinkability,
the IDP must not know the (persistent) public key of the RP,
lest the IDP could infer which service a user is about to access.
Thus, the RP and IDP should anonymously share a random
ephemeral key. A Diffie-Hellman Key-Exchange (DHKE) [13]
mediated by the hub would provide a solution in the honest-
but-curious setting. However, we want a solution resilient to
an active man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack performed by a
malicious hub. A specific difficulty is that the RP and IDP
are anonymous vis-a-vis each other, making it difficult to au-
thenticate messages between them. This can be overcome by
an auxiliary-channel-DHKE type of protocol [28], which in-
volves exchanging between RP and IDP a short value that is
unpredictable by the hub in a single trial.
To achieve the above mentioned solution, the RP could
initially (step 1 in Fig. 3) show a short random session identi-
fier (a “PIN” of 8-10 characters) to the user, who would then
input it back (e.g., through copy-and-paste) during her authen-
tication with the IDP, along with her login credentials (step 9
in Fig. 3). A MITM attack would succeed only in the unlikely
case the hub correctly guesses the PIN on a first try, and would
fail and be detected in any other case; the resulting exchanged
key could still be as large as needed. Another way, additionally
ensuring edge unlinkability even in presence of a malicious
RP, is to have the user choose the random PIN. This could
be facilitated by an embedded functionality in web browsers,
or by separate software or hardware (e.g., similar to what is
used in certain two-factor authentication mechanisms), poten-
tially on a different medium. In §5.3 we show that, to prevent
certain impersonation attacks, when a malicious hub colludes
with a malicious relying party, the PIN should ideally be ob-
tained jointly by the user and the RP, e.g., using an efficient
two-party coin-flipping protocol.
Usability. A usability evaluation, which we advocate even
without PINs, would be useful to determine how to best inte-
grate user interaction into the transaction protocol. For a user,
the complexity of inserting a PIN is likely comparable to the
complexity already required to authenticate to the IDP via a
username and password. The burden of manual intervention by
the user would be comparable to that required to solve a typi-
cal CAPTCHA [37], e.g., inserting a short code into an input
field (upon some mental work) – a security measure that would
already make sense at the RP side. Alternatively, the whole
process of copy-and-paste and/or random sampling could be
made seamless if the design constraints allowed user-side soft-
ware (optionally trusted by the user) to automate some of these
actions.
Integrate attributes. Once a key is shared between IDP and
RP, they can resolve different types of requests: transmission
of (a group of) attributes; secure comparison of attributes; or
any of the previous but associated with a certain predicate
of the attributes. Secure comparison can be achieved by each
party (RP and IDP) hashing the attributes, then enciphering the
hash (using the ephemeral random key) and then sending the
resulting ciphertext to the hub, who then sends the result of
comparison to RP. In the case of transmission of attributes, the
IDP can simply send the attribute values in encrypted form,
even though this hinders the enforcement of edge unlinkabil-
ity. Authenticated encryption can be used to ensure confiden-
tiality and integrity, in spite of hub mediation. Alternatively,
this may be reduced to secure comparison if the user serves
as an auxiliary channel, inputting its own attributes in RP and
then requesting a secure comparison to be performed. There
may also be value in hiding from the hub some details of the
attribute request, e.g., the kind of predicate being compared.
5.3 Impersonation by a malicious hub
We show four attacks where a malicious hub violates authen-
ticity by successfully impersonating a legitimate user, in a va-
riety of contexts.
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Impersonation at intended RP. A compromised hub pro-
ceeds with the protocol until building the authentication as-
sertion required for the RP, but then impersonates the honest
user to conclude the protocol with the RP (Steps 22 and 23
in Fig. 3). The attack succeeds if the RP has not established a
shared secret with the honest user, to verify that the user did
not change during the execution of the protocol. To foil this
attack, the RP may set a fresh secret cookie on the user agent
in the first step of the transaction, similar to a cross-site re-
quest forgery token [4]. The hub would not have access to this
cookie, and later in the protocol the RP would confirm that
the cookie is held by the user. Unfortunately, the FCCX and
GOV.UK Verify documentation make no mention of this type
of measure. Regardless, the next three impersonation attacks
succeed even assuming that this cookie protection is in place.
Impersonation at any RP, without user authentication at
IDP. In FCCX, access to a user account at an RP depends
only on an assertion signed by the hub with a respective user
pseudonym (v) (step 22 in Fig. 3) and attributes. Thus, once
a malicious hub has brokered access from a user to an RP, it
can arbitrarily replay the access in the future, without even in-
volving an IDP. The same attack can be performed in GOV.UK
Verify if a malicious hub and MS collude (step 23). The attack
might be detected only a posteriori, if the RP gives the respec-
tive assertion (signed by the hub and/or MS) to an auditor and
the auditor requests from the hub (or MS) the respective as-
sertion signed by IDP, which does not exist. The attack can
be foiled by preventing the hub (and MS) from learning the
user pseudonym at any given RP, which is precisely what our
solution for strong unlinkability (§5.1.2) achieves.
Impersonation at any RP, upon user authentication at IDP.
After an honest user initiates a transaction with RP1, a mali-
ciously compromised hub receives an authentication request
with ID n1 (step 4 in Fig. 3). Then, impersonating the user, this
hub starts a new transaction with RP2 (which may or may not
be RP1), obtaining a new request ID n2. The hub then sends
to the IDP an authentication request with ID n2 (instead of
n1) (step 8). In return, it receives an authentication assertion
signed by the IDP (step 12), associated with n2 and with u.
Then, the hub simply continues the transaction that it initiated,
impersonating the victim user (involving MS, in GOV.UK Ver-
ify) until it gains access to RP2 as the impersonated user. The
attack does not break traceability in FCCX or GOV.UK Ver-
ify, because the authentication ID n2 is signed by all parties,
and goes undetected by MS and RP2, who receive expected
verifiable signed authentication assertions. The legitimate user
only experiences an aborted execution, possibly camouflaged
as a network/connection error, and without visibility over n1
and n2. The attack is possible due to insufficient binding be-
tween the user request at RP and the user authentication at
IDP. The user has no guarantee that the relation with the in-
tended RP will be maintained. This attack too can be defeated
by our proposal to enforce strong unlinkability, with the user
transmitting a (random) PIN between RP and IDP, which al-
lows RP and IDP to share a random key. Then, the originating
RP will extract a valid pseudonym only if the shared key is
associated with the intended user account at the IDP.
Impersonation at unintended RP2, if a malicious hub
colludes with the intended (but malicious) RP1. Assum-
ing the solution to the previous impersonation attacks (user-
transmitted PIN) is deployed, there remains a possible attack
if (i) the malicious hub colludes with RP1 with which the user
wants to authenticate, and (ii) the user selects the PIN herself.
Indeed, the (malicious) RP1 can inform the malicious hub of
the user PIN. Then, the hub can impersonate the user request-
ing access to a different (honest) RP2 using the same PIN, for a
transaction with a new random authentication ID n2. The hub
then leads the user to authenticate into the IDP, using authenti-
cation ID n2 instead of n1. The user will then provide the IDP
with the expected PIN. Knowing the PIN, the malicious hub
can perform a successful active MITM attack, sharing one key
directly with IDP and (possibly another) with RP2, and eventu-
ally gaining access to RP2 as the impersonated user. In FCCX,
the hub gains further ability to impersonate a user at any later
time, even without involving the IDP, because it learns the user
pseudonym v. To thwart the described attack, the PIN may
be decided by a coin-flip between user and RP, ensuring it is
random even if either RP or the user (e.g., in case of imper-
sonation) are malicious. Alternatively, if the user is willing to
forgo edge unlinkability against a malicious RP (e.g., due to
usability reasons), then the PIN can simply be chosen by the
RP (and still transmitted to the IDP by the user).
5.4 Traceability and forensics
Traceability. The signatures exchanged between parties in
FCCX and GOV.UK Verify provide some level of traceability
if the hub is honest. If questioned by an auditor about a certain
authentication assertion or request, the hub can show a related
assertion or request (assuming respective logs are recorded).
However, for the same request from RP or same assertion from
IDP, a malicious hub may produce several requests and as-
sertions. For example: (i) in GOV.UK Verify, the hub could
undetectably send the assertion to two different MSs, to ille-
gitimately obtain two user identifiers; (ii) in FCCX, the hub
could undetectably produce assertions for two different RPs;
(iii) in FCCX and GOV.UK Verify the hub could collude with
a rogue IDP, to obtain a respective assertion, besides the le-
gitimate one. Later, in a limited audit the malicious hub could
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use the most convenient justification, while hiding the legiti-
mate and/or other illegitimate ones. We argue that this can be
improved with a property of one-to-one traceability. The intu-
ition is that each party commits to the details of the next action,
before receiving the “justification” (i.e., the signed material)
referring to the previous action. The commitments need not be
opened during the transaction, but only in case of auditing. We
have already sketched in §5.1.1.1 how to achieve this in con-
nection with weak unlinkability, with respect to pseudonyms.
In Appendix C we give another example related to session IDs.
Selective forensic disclosure. The coarse-grained nuance is
trivially possible by the weak and strong unlinkability property
that we have proposed. For that, a compelled IDP just needs to
let the hub know of all transactions associated with the same
user account at IDP. While this breaks weak unlinkability for
the user, it preserves the privacy of other users and so it is al-
ready strictly better in comparison with FCCX and GOV.UK
Verify, where selectiveness of forensic disclosure is not possi-
ble (as linkable identifiers are leaked to the hub by default in
all transactions). The fine-grained nuance is possible via a dif-
ferent procedure, based on a transaction flagged as a forensic
investigation. Given a pinpointed transaction with (IDP, user,
RP1), and a targeted RP2, the hub initiates a forensic trans-
action between RP2 and IDP. This is a regular transaction but
with two main differences. First, since the IDP is collabora-
tive, it interacts with the hub as if the actual user (defined by u)
had authenticated – as a result (and assuming the solution for
strong unlinkability) the RP learns (but the hub does not) the
respective user pseudonym at the RP. Second, the RP receives
information that this is a forensic transaction – the informa-
tion is signaled through the IDP, independently of the hub, in
order to prevent a malicious hub from actually impersonating
the user. This allows RP to control whether or not (depending
on the subpoena) to give the hub access to the internal user
account. Then, a collaborative RP may inform the hub about
the past transactions (i.e., their session IDs) involving the same
user account.
6 Concluding remarks
We have evidenced severe privacy and security problems in
FCCX and GOV.UK Verify and have shown feasible solutions
to address them. Passively, the hub is able to profile all users in
respect to their interactions across different service providers.
If compromised, the hub can even actively impersonate users
to gain access to their accounts (and the associated private
data) at service providers. This represents a serious danger to
citizen privacy and, more generally, to civil liberties. The de-
scribed vulnerabilities are exploitable and could lead to unde-
tected mass surveillance, completely at odds with the views of
the research community [19] whose scientific advances enable
feasible solutions that are more private and secure.
Based on the findings presented in this paper, we believe
that a security review should lead to fundamental structural
adjustments in the interest of privacy and security. It is clear
that the FCCX and GOV.UK Verify do not adequately consider
the need for resilience against a compromised hub and fail to
address plausible threats.
We have described solutions to the main problems we
identified. However, a comprehensive solution for brokered
identification would require greater formalization and we hope
this paper serves as a call for more research. One would need
a design specification and proper requirements, followed by a
fully specified, unambiguous protocol accompanied by a proof
of security. As a first step, we strongly recommend that a for-
mal framework for brokered authentication be devised, per-
haps based on the ideal/real simulation paradigm (e.g., [8]).
Such a framework would integrate all the security, privacy and
auditability properties at stake, while considering an adversar-
ial model in which any party, including the hub, may be com-
promised and/or collude with other parties.
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A Integration of attributes
Supported attributes. In Fig. 3, we left implicit in the au-
thentication requests (steps 4, 6 and 7) what are the requested
attributes. In GOV.UK Verify, there is a set of default at-
tributes, denoted matching dataset (MDS), which is explic-
itly required by MS, so we assume that they will always be
provided (if available) by the IDP. They are composed of the
first-name, surname, middle names, date of birth, gender, cur-
rent and previous address [21]. In the “current FCCX flow”
[36], attributes are integrated in the authentication assertion
sent by IDP. The respective “Identity Services Support” solic-
itation states that “CSPs are expected to support returning pre-
determined attributes, based on the attributes specified in the
SAML metadata.” This may involve “dynamic combinations
of attributes (attribute request groups) made of individual at-
tributes (or parsed portion of an attribute, e.g., the last four
digits of social-security number)” if requested by the RP [17].
The possible attribute groupings are still to be defined. The
required supported attributes are the legal first and last name,
middle name or initial, current address (parsed and full), date
of birth (parsed and full), social security number (parsed and
full), email address.
We recommend that a good solution should: allow trans-
actions without attributes; require informed user consent about
each request, after making explicit which attributes are in-
volved; achieve traceability in respect to attributes, e.g., so
that hub can prove that attributes requested to IDP are not more
than those required by the RP. Also, in a privacy preserving so-
lution, where the replied attribute values are hidden from the
hub (this is not the case in FCCX or GOV.UK Verify), there
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may be value in hiding from the hub the type of attribute re-
quest (e.g., which attributes are being requested).
Non-supported types of transactions. NSTIC foresees sev-
eral types of transactions, with different nuances of anonymity
and identification [30, Req. 12]. For a transaction to be anony-
mous with validated attributes, the RP does not receive a user
pseudonym but verifies some attributes; e.g., it learns that the
age of the user is within a certain range, but is not able to
link different transactions to the same user. For a transaction
to be pseudonymous without attributes, the RP always learns
the same pseudonym for the same user but does not learn any
user attribute. At present, it appears that these more privacy-
preserving types of transactions are not supported in FCCX
and GOV.UK Verify. We find a hint in FCCX for pseudony-
mous identification [17, Q&A 2.2], but only subsequent to an
initial identification with attributes, i.e, when RP can already
associate the pseudonym with attributes [36].
Attribute enrichment. The case of attribute enrichment cor-
responds to additional ATPs complementing the attribute val-
ues that the original IDP may (or may not) provide. In
GOV.UK Verify, this is described [20, Steps 9 to 19] but it
is informed that it will not be implemented in the current ser-
vice. In FCCX, this is illustrated by a use-case [35, UseCase
7b] and other high-level requirements, but some aspects are
undefined. In both cases, the hub determines who are the ap-
propriate ATP(s) and then requests and obtains the respective
user attributes – it is not clear how the ATP is located, and it
seems that the user is not involved in the process. We propose
instead that the hub (or the IDP) should ask the user to choose
an ATP, in the same way that it asks to choose an IDP, i.e.,
by means of a selector list and then followed by authentica-
tion. A needed technicality is ensuring that the accounts at the
several IDP/ATPs correspond to the same user (e.g., via user
matching, as suggested in §5.1.3) while solving the problem
of unlinkability across IDPs. There are other complexities that
may be associated with attributes:
– “Account name mapping” may be required to uniformize
the labels given to each attribute, if different parties (e.g.,
RP, IDP) use different labels – this can be resolved without
involving the values of the respective attributes;
– “Consolidation of attributes” may be required when the re-
ply to send to RP derives from a composition (e.g., involv-
ing conjunctions and disjunctions) of attributes from differ-
ent ATPs – some of these cases can be directly solved with
clever techniques, without requiring visibility of attribute
values. If there are remaining cases where consolidation is
difficult, we recommend that the user is allowed to choose
a trusted IDP/ATP (or II, as in §5.1.3) to perform such op-
eration, instead of allowing attribute visibility to the hub.
Consent for attributes. The matter of user consent con-
cerning attributes was not included in the described protocol
(Fig. 3). For FCCX, the recent “Identity services support” so-
licitation requires that the user sees the actual values and gives
opt-in consent, before transmission [17]. However, it is not
clear if consent will be asked before the attributes are actually
requested to the ATP and before they pass in clear through the
hub. In GOV.UK Verify, the user consent is requested if the
requested attributes are beyond the default MDS [20, Step 12],
but it is not clear if the user sees the attribute values. Also, in
GOV.UK Verify the user does not have any control over the
attribute values kept by the MS. In both systems, it seems that
the hub interfaces directly with the ATPs.
A a way to improve the privacy of the user, we suggest
that the user be given the opportunity to give informed con-
sent in two stages. First, about the type of request, either when
contacting the RP or when asked to select an IDP. Second,
upon confirming the specific attributes values, at the IDP. For
example, once logging into the IDP, the user could visualize
the attribute values and reconfirm (i.e., decide whether or not
to allow) their transmission/integration.
We advocate that the same type of consent should be re-
quired when involving ATPs other than the IDP. Since it seems
that in FCCX and GOV.UK Verify the user is not involved in
selecting and/or authenticating to the ATP, here the consent
could have to be mediated by the hub. However, we notice that
it would be a privacy shortcoming to allow the user to give con-
sent about attribute values only after the hub has already seen
such values. This is an incentive to consider a solution where
the user can choose another party (i.e., not the hub) with whom
to trust the process of attribute enrichment, e.g., possibly the
IDP, or a single ATP. We also advocate that, whenever techni-
cally possible (namely regarding usability restrictions on the
user), the user be given opportunity to choose the type of at-
tribute integration, e.g., secure comparison instead of direct
transmission. Secure comparison might involve the user pass-
ing to the RP, e.g., via copy-and-paste, her own attribute val-
ues, so that the RP can then perform a secure comparison with
the IDP and/or ATPs, intermediated by a sightless hub.
B Unlinkability of other identifiers
Side-channels or covert channels can be used with or without
intention to leak identifiers that allow some types of linkability.
Weak unlinkability vs. user-agent identifiers. Weak and
strong unlinkability are defeated if the hub is able to use side-
channel information to link the user across different transac-
tions. For example, on a typical usage a user may keep invari-
ant her own IP-address, and/or other information leaked about
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the user-agent (e.g., identifiers of the web-browser and plug-
ins). The techniques to reduce such side-channel information
are outside of the scope of this paper (e.g., connecting through
an anonymized network, and using software that shields the
amount of leaked information). Nonetheless, we advocate that
such concerns should be made explicit in regard to the specifi-
cation of the records kept by the hub, and that the users should
be informed of the respective potential for linkability.
Edge unlinkability vs. attributes. Several side-channels from
IDP to RP also exist, e.g., in the encoding of attributes, con-
textual records, and respective complex XML structures. We
do not find any suggestion in FCCX of GOV.UK Verify about
normalization, or active sanitization by the hub or MS, to avoid
such side (or even covert) channels. They can for example be
avoided by enforcing secure comparison of attributes, instead
of direct transmission. If the RP already knows the candidate
attribute values then the hub can mediate a secure compari-
son, by comparing randomized hiding commitments of the at-
tributes, as submitted separately by IDP and RP. A random
value shared between IDP and RP, and kept secret from the
hub (see §5.2) would determine the randomization.
Edge unlinkability vs. session ID. SAML specifies that the
authentication request ID n must be unique [31, §1.3.4], but
does not specify that it cannot be linkable to the issuer. Thus,
if it is an invariant across a transaction, i.e., the same at RP
and IDP (as required in GOV.UK Verify), then it can be triv-
ially used to leak to the IDP who the RP is, thus breaking edge
unlinkability. This could happen even in compliant implemen-
tations, e.g., if it is a counter (likely to be different across RPs
and thus acting as a pseudonym), or even a concatenation of
the RP identifier and a counter. A malicious RP could fur-
ther define n as an enciphering of a randomized version of
its own public identifier, thus revealing itself to an IDP pos-
sessing the appropriate key; no auditing by the hub (oblivious
to the key) would distinguish this request ID from a genuinely
random one. One solution against this is to use an efficient
coin-flipping protocol between the hub and RP, to enforce a
random session ID. Alternatively, and additionally avoiding
linkage through session IDs even if comparing the databases
of the IDP and RP, the hub may use with IDP an authentication
request ID (n’) different from the one (n) received from RP.
Care is needed in this case to ensure traceability (see §C).
C Traceability of session ID
Traceability allows auditability of transaction steps, by allow-
ing each party in isolation (RP, IDP, hub, MS) to prove, to an
auditor, that its actions were justified. For example, a signed
authentication request sent from the hub to an IDP should be
justifiable only by a respective signed request received from a
RP. Here, we consider only the case of session IDs. A complete
solution to brokered identification should integrate several pri-
vacy and security properties, so this discussion serves only as
an example of the spirit in which to achieve traceability. A final
solution should undergo greater formalization and analysis.
Below, we assume that the session ID (n′) used for inter-
action between the hub and IDP is different from the one (n)
used for interaction between the hub and RP in the same trans-
action. (We do not know if this is the case in the actual FCCX
system.) For example, this may be desirable to simultaneously
prevent the session ID from being used as a covert-channel
from RP to IDP, and from being a common identifier at the
two edges. While the covert channel could be avoided by de-
ciding the session ID via a two-party coin-flipping between
the hub and the RP, its commonness at both edges can only be
avoided by actually transforming the session ID. However, if
the transformation imposed by the hub is arbitrary, then a ma-
liciously compromised hub could produce different plausible
justifications for each step of a transaction. Such a hub could
initiate several paths of execution and later (during an audit)
only reveal the most convenient one. For example, if a signed
request sent to IDP were audited, the hub could associate with
it any signed request received from any RP. (We are ignoring
here other metadata; e.g., if timestamps are present then they
need to remain consistent across the steps of the transaction.)
Intuition. Let n be the request ID upon a successful initial in-
teraction between the RP and the hub. We want a mechanism
such that a malicious hub later interacting with the same RP,
or a honest hub later interacting with the same but malicious
RP, is not able to obtain a signed request with the same ID.
Furthermore, if later a malicious hub and a different and ma-
licious RP collude to produce a signed request with the same
ID, then it should not be possible, in an audit, to validate such
request in connection with this other RP. These properties can
be achieved by deriving the request ID from two random con-
tributions, one from the hub and another from the RP, and also
from an identifier of the RP, in a collision-resistant manner.
One can also easily embed an association with an identifier of
the IDP, by having the hub learn in advance which IDP the user
selects. In such a case, an auditor can only successfully verify
the session ID in association with a single pair (IDP, RP).
Then, let n′ be the request ID used by the hub in the sub-
sequent request sent to the IDP. The new request ID should be
derivable unequivocally by the hub from the previous request
ID n and its associated secret information. However, it should
not be decidable by the RP (who also knows n), so that it is not
linkable upon collusion of IDP and RP. This can be achieved
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by letting n′ depend on information committed by n, provable
by the hub and unknown by the RP.
A proof-of-concept of how to achieve this is given in
Fig. 5. We emphasize that this is not an optimized protocol
and better solutions may exist, namely when integrating other
metadata, a set of intended audit actions and remaining aspects
of the overall brokered identification protocol.
Description. Initially, the RP selects an auxiliary session ID
nR for communication with the hub (45). The RP then sends
encrypted to the hub, via a user redirection, this session ID
along with a signature (46). We leave implicit the metadata
necessary for the hub to understand which IDPs might be able
to fulfill the request. At this point, the hub interacts with the
user to select an IDP (47). Then, the hub selects a random
transformer element nH (48), which will later be helpful to
transform a request ID from the RP into a request ID to the
IDP. The hub then computes: a commitment χH to the triplet
composed of the RP identifier, the IDP identifier and the trans-
former element (49); and the request ID n for the RP as a
collision-resistant hash of the triplet composed of the identi-
fier of the RP, the auxiliary session ID nR decided by the RP
and the commitment computed by the hub (50). The hub then
sends directly to the RP (i.e., without user redirection) a mes-
sage with the request ID n and the respective components of
the pre-image (51). The RP verifies that the received request
ID is consistent with the hash of the respectively received pre-
image (52) and also (not shown) that the RP identifier is cor-
rect. Finally, the RP sends to the hub an actual authentication
request {n}, properly formatted for logging purposes, includ-
ing a respective signature with the accepted request ID n (53).
The hub verifies (not shown) that the request ID is as expected
and that the signature is correct.
The hub then concatenates the request ID n from the RP
with the secret transformer nH, and calculates the respective
collision-resistant hash, thus obtaining a value r that is unpre-
dictable by RP (54). We assume here a random oracle model,
i.e., that when the pre-image is unpredictable, the hash output
is pseudo-random. The hub then concatenates this value to an
identifier of the IDP and computes again a collision-resistant
hash to obtain the new request ID to use with the IDP (55).
Finally, the IDP sends to the IDP, via a user-redirection, the
signed request adjusted as need be, namely using the new re-
quest ID n′, and disclosing the preimage containing the IDP
identifier (56). Thus, the IDP can verify (not shown) that it is
the only valid recipient of this ID.
From a user-experience perspective, the protocol retains
the same flow as in FCCX or GOV.UK Verify, because no fur-
ther redirections were needed. The user is at most subjected to
a few tenths of a second of extra delay. This delay may even
be avoided, by forwarding the user to the IDP immediately
RP ∶ nR ←$ {0,1}∣authN ID∣ (auxiliary session ID) (45)
RPù hub ∶ Ehub (nR, σRP(nR)) (46)
hub↔ user ∶ Select IDP (47)
hub ∶ nH ←$ {0,1}∣authN ID∣ (select random transformer) (48)
hub ∶ χH ←$ C(RP, IDP, nH) (commitment to edgesand transformer ) (49)
hub ∶ n = CR-Hash(RP, nR, χH) (request ID for the RP) (50)
hub→ RP ∶ ERP (nR, n,RP, χH) (51)
RP ∶ Verify CR-Hash(RP, nR, χH) =? n (52)
RP→ hub ∶ Ehub (nR,{n} , σRP({n})) (53)
hub ∶ r = CR-Hash(n,nH) (54)
hub ∶ n′ = CR-Hash(IDP, r) (request ID for the IDP) (55)
hubù IDP ∶ EIDP({n′} , σhub({n′}), IDP, r) (56)
... (protocol continues)
Fig. 5. Achieving traceability with changing authentication
request ID. Note: this example only shows the component
RP→hub→IDP. See legends of Fig. 3 and Fig. 4.
after the IDP selection (47), so that the user can start perform-
ing authentication while the hub and RP continue the proto-
col. Then, the hub would “catch up” with the IDP (56) via a
direct connection—this would only require an extra auxiliary
random session ID decided unilaterally by the hub.
Audit action. The hub can prove to an auditor that the session
ID in the signed request {n′} sent to IDP (56) is the only one
possible based on the signed request {n} received from RP
(53). For that, the hub opens the triplet (RP, IDP, nH) from χH
(49) and then the auditor verifies that CR-Hash(RP, nR, χH) =
n and CR-Hash(IDP, r) = n′, with r = CR-Hash(n,nH),
where “RP” and “IDP” are the identifiers of the RP and IDP
that signed the requests with IDs n and n′, respectively.
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